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T
he Federal Reserve massively expanded its balance
sheet by increasing lending to depository institu-
tions in the wake of the announcement by Lehman
Brothers in mid-September 2008 that it was filing for bank-
ruptcy. As financial market conditions improved and some
loans were repaid, the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) decided at its March 2009 meeting to further
expand the balance sheet by purchasing $1.75 trillion in
mortgage-backed securities and agency and Treasury
securities. At the November 2010 meeting, the Committee
announced its intent to purchase an additional $600 billion
in longer-term Treasury securities, again expanding its
balance sheet. The size of the Fed’s balance sheet has led
many analysts and policymakers, including several FOMC
members, to be concerned that inflation could
rise above the FOMC’s objective.1 This essay
reviews the inflation rate relative to the Fed’s
inflation objective since 2000 and the likeli-
hood that higher inflation is a problem policy-
makers may face in the coming months.
The FOMC’s inflation objective is often
characterized as “2 percent or a bit under.”
Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke confirmed this
at his first post-FOMC-meeting press confer-
ence on April 27, 2011. He noted that the
central tendency for the FOMC’s forecast for
personal consumption expenditures (PCE)
inflation for 2011-13 was 1.7 to 2.0 percent.
The Chairman noted that “these longer-run
projections can be interpreted as indicating
the inflation rate that Committee participants
judge to be most consistent with the Federal
Reserve’s mandate to foster maximum employ-
ment and stable prices.”2
The chart shows the year-over-year PCE
inflation rate and the FOMC’s target for the
federal funds rate over the period January
2000 through August 2011. The chart clearly
shows that more often than not the PCE inflation rate has
exceeded the FOMC’s 2 percent inflation objective.3 How -
ever, the chart also shows that the FOMC generally raised
the target rate when inflation was high and/or rising rela-
tive to its objective and reduced it when inflation was low
and/or declining relative to its objective. Hence, the policy
actions were broadly consistent with a commitment to
achieve the Committee’s longer-run inflation objective.
The exception occurred in August 2007 when the FOMC
began reducing its funds rate target even though PCE
inflation had been at or above the inflation objective. The
Committee’s reductions of the funds rate target continued
based on concerns about the effects of the financial crisis
even while inflation continued to accelerate. The chart
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Percent Percentshows that the Fed’s easing of policy had no deleterious
effect on inflation, which was likely partially due to the
2007-09 recession. However, it may also reflect the public’s
faith that the FOMC would continue to conduct monetary
policy in a manner consistent with achieving its longer-run
inflation objective, thus affirming the FOMC’s inflation
credibility.
Inflation has accelerated during the past 18 months.
The year-over-year PCE inflation rate in August was 2.9
percent, and the monthly annual inflation rate has averaged
2.2 percent since the recession ended. The recent rise in
the inflation rate may not currently concern the public
because the FOMC has indicated that it expects “inflation
will settle, over coming quarters, at levels at or below those
consistent with the Committee’s” inflation objective and
that it would “continue to pay close attention to the evolu-
tion of inflation and inflation expectations.”4
In order to maintain its credibility, however, the FOMC
will need to take actions consistent with achieving its stated
inflation objective. When the FOMC was targeting the
federal funds rate, the public could determine whether
the Committee’s behavior was consistent with its inflation
objective by observing changes in the funds rate target rela-
tive to the behavior of inflation. With the funds rate target
at zero and the FOMC effectively committed to maintain-
ing a zero rate until mid-2013, the public will look for other
actions to judge the FOMC’s commitment to its longer-run
inflation objective should the inflation rate remain signifi-
cantly above that objective or, worse, accelerate further.
Possible FOMC actions could include (1) outright sales
of securities or temporary reverse repurchase agreements
(repos) to reduce the size of the balance sheet, (2) increas-
ing the interest rate it pays on excess reserves, or (3) issuing
term deposits at competitive interest rates. Such actions
would be necessary to slow the growth of the money supply
to reduce inflationary pressures.5 Failure to take significant
actions in the face of high or rising inflation could cause
the public to question the FOMC’s resolve to meet its infla-
tion objective.
Weakening of the FOMC’s credibility would significantly
undermine its ability to control inflation. Consequently,
the FOMC would have to do what it did in the late 1970s
to regain its credibility: Conduct monetary policy that is
sufficiently restrictive—and ultimately successful—to restore
the public’s confidence in the Committee’s commitment to
achieving its inflation objective. As Narayana Kocherlakota,
president of the Minneapolis Fed, has noted, such a policy
response “would generate substantial losses of employment.”
Indeed, the losses could be much larger than the employ-
ment gains achieved by maintaining an excessively easy
monetary policy in the face of a marked and persistent
rise in inflation. If inflation remains high or accelerates,
analysts will be watching to see how the FOMC handles
this difficult balancing act. ■
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In order to maintain its credibility,
however, the FOMC will have to take
actions consistent with achieving 
its stated inflation objective.